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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF A STUDENT:
“STRIP-SEARCHED”
AMY J. SLUSZKA, ESQ.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, school children across the
country have become victims of violence at the hands of their
own classmates. On April 20, 1999 in Columbine, Colorado,
twelve high school students and one teacher were shot and
killed when two other students (Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold) brought semi-automatic weapons to school. Similar
episodes have resulted in innocent children losing their lives
in a very gruesome and merciless way. Instigated by fear,
parents and school officials have demanded that something be
done to ensure a safe environment where children can learn
and prosper.
Although this fear and demand for change are justified,
the actions of the school officials in the case of a strip search
of a young girl were not.1 On October 8, 2003 school officials
asked a thirteen-year-old girl (Redding) to strip down to her
underwear.2 She was then asked to pull her underwear away
from her body to expose her breasts and pelvic area so that
the school officials could see if she was concealing
prescription strength ibuprofen (a tip they had received from
another student).3 When this search revealed nothing but her
naked young body, she was allowed to dress and return to
class.4
 Graduate of the Southern New England School of Law, 2010,
North Dartmouth, MA and member of the CT and MA Bars.
1 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
2 Id. at 2635.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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Schools are given the difficult responsibility of balancing
a student’s legitimate expectation of privacy against the
school’s need to maintain safety and order. Deferring to the
school officials’ discretion is beneficial because when danger
to the other students is imminent (such as in the case of
Columbine), a swift course of action is imperative. However,
granting schools carte blanche to search a child’s body is
unreasonable.
In 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States
Supreme Court established precedent with regard to searches
of students in schools.5 In the case of T.L.O., the school
officials searched a female student’s purse looking to find
cigarettes or other smoking paraphernalia.6 In 2009, the Court
was again asked to look at the constitutionality of searches of
students in Safford Unified School District  v. Redding.7 But,
in Redding, the search went much further while the item
sought could arguably be considered no more harmful than a
cigarette.8 While in contrast to T.L.O.9, the Supreme Court
found in Redding that the search was unreasonable.10 But
even in Redding, it would not go so far as to punish the
school officials who conducted the search.11 Perhaps the
Court granted immunity because it did not want to create an
environment where school officials are afraid to do their jobs,
and thus adding to the problem of safety in schools. But,
without fear of liability, will school officials continue to go
too far? The strip search endured by Redding has forced
society and the Supreme Court to once again look at the
constitution as applied to children in schools. How can we
teach lessons and instill morals in schools if they are unsafe?
How can we make children accountable for their actions
without violating their rights?
5 New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
6 Id.
7 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
8 Id. at 2635.
9 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
10 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2635, 2643
(2009).
11 Id. at 2633.
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II. THE FOURTHAMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”12 An individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
inherent in the Constitution are not to be taken lightly.
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.13 Here, the “people” are students.
Case law has clearly established the application of the
Fourth Amendment with regard to police officers.14 But, in
1985 the Supreme Court of the United States established the
application of the Fourth Amendment with regard to searches
of students in public schools conducted by school officials.15
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public
school officials, and thus is not limited to searches carried out
by law enforcement officers.16
The decision in T.L.O. changed the Court’s prior view
that school officials act in loco parentis (in place of the
parent) but instead “. . . act as representatives of the State . .
.” when carrying out searches.17 School officials, therefore, “.
. . cannot claim parents’ immunity from the Fourth
Amendment’s strictures.”18 For practical reasons, school
officials are not required to obtain a warrant before searching
a student, nor do they need probable cause to conduct a
search.19 The reason for this distinction from law
enforcement is because the safety of the rest of the children is
imminent and obtaining a warrant can mean a lengthy judicial
process. Thus, the complication is defining the line between
protecting school children as a whole and respecting the
rights of an individual child.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
14 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).




19 Id. at 326.
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It is well established that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”20 The
United States Supreme Court has held that protection is
applicable to searches and seizures conducted by state actors,
including public school officials, via the Fourteenth
Amendment.21 Reasonableness is the touchstone in any
assessment of the constitutionality of a search or seizure, and
while, in most cases, reasonableness demands a warrant and a
showing of probable cause, such is not necessarily the case in
the public school context.22
III. THEUNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: NEW JERSEY V.
T.L.O.
T.L.O., provided that “the legality of a search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search . . . and should not be
excessively intrusive in light of the student’s age and sex and
nature of the infraction.”23 One can deduce that the Court
established a 2-prong test for determining the
constitutionality of a search of a student’s person or
belongings: (1) the search must be reasonable; and (2) the
search must not be excessively intrusive taking into
consideration the age, sex, and violation committed by the
student.24 As is required by law enforcement conducting a
search, the search by the school official must be reasonable at
its inception and reasonable in its scope.25
A search will be deemed reasonable at its inception if
there are reasonable grounds for the school official to suspect
that the search will reveal evidence that the student either has
or will violate the law or rules of the school.26 In Redding, the
20 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
21 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
22 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828
(2002).
23 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–42 (1985).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 326.
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ground for the inception of the search was a tip from another
student.27 To be reasonable in its scope, the means of the
search must be “. . . reasonably related to the objectives of the
search . . .” while also taking into account the “. . . age and
sex [of the student] . . .,” as well as the suspected violation.28
Here, the threshold of evidence is not probable cause, but
only reasonable suspicion.29 In T.L.O., the Court sets forth a
step-by-step analysis of the reasonableness of the search
conducted by the school official.30
The reasonableness was tested at the inception of the
search, the manner in which the search was conducted, and
the further search into the student’s purse once the original
evidence was revealed.31 Here, the principal was informed by
another school official that two students had been smoking in
the lavatory in violation of the school ban.32 One could argue
that that the tip in this case is presumably reliable since it was
given by another school official and not by another student or
anonymous source, as was the case in Redding.33
Before the principal commenced the search, the student
was questioned about her involvement with the alleged
violation (smoking cigarettes in the lavatory in violation of
school rules).34 Next, the principal looked into the student’s
purse where he found cigarettes and rolling papers.35 The
presence of the rolling papers reasonably led the principal to
believe that there may be other drug paraphernalia in the
student’s purse.36 A further, more thorough, search of the
purse confirmed his suspicion.37 During a search,
reasonableness must be present on a continuum; from its
inception to conclusion and at every step therein.38 From the
27 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).





33 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).




38 Id. at 330.
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Court’s analysis, one can deduce that suspicion deemed
reasonable to search a student’s locker may not be reasonable
to warrant the search of a student’s clothing or unclothed
body.
Only after careful consideration, did the Court find that
the search in T.L.O. was not a violation of the student’s
constitutional rights.39 This landmark case stressed the
importance of a student’s constitutional rights while also
establishing a standard by which school officials can abide
and still maintain order and safety in the school:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied
to the States, protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they
may not perform within the limits of the Bill
of Rights. That they are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.40
A. The “Reasonableness” Standard
If T.L.O. did not establish a clear, bright-line rule for
which school officials to abide by, then Redding did not make
it any clearer. Determining “reasonableness” is a challenge
that lawyers and judges face every day, so it is no wonder
that the standard is also confusing to school officials.  By the
very nature of their positions as caretakers and educators of
39 Id. at 326.
40 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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children, the standard to which they are held with regard to
the Fourth Amendment is already somewhat relaxed.41
In almost every area of the law, we are held to a standard
of “reasonableness” in a given situation. In tort, the standard
of reasonableness is whether or not a “reasonable person”
would have acted the same under the circumstances. In order
to calculate damages for a breach of contract, the court must
look to see if the injured party “reasonably relied” on the
contract. If a criminal defendant wants to use self-defense as
an affirmative defense, he must prove that he used
“reasonable force.” And, if an attorney wants to avoid
disbarment, she must act as a “reasonable attorney.” We are
even afforded beyond a “reasonable” doubt as burden of
proof.
When the law finds an action to be unreasonable for one
purpose, it may not be for another. For example, in Redding,
the Court held that the search of Redding was unreasonable
for Fourth Amendment purposes, but it found that the school
officials’ actions were not unreasonable enough to subject
them to liability.42 It is alarming that the decision in Redding
turned on the object of the search and not the type of search.
By virtue of its decision in Redding, the Supreme Court tells
us that a strip search of high school student is not inherently
unreasonable.43
B. Qualified Immunity in Redding
In Redding, the Supreme Court reasoned that the lower
court’s inconsistent interpretation of T.L.O. warranted
qualified immunity for the school officials.44 The Court
ultimately held that the potential dangers of a prescription
strength ibuprofen do not give rise to warrant a strip search of
a student.45 To the author, this is just common sense. But, by
granting the school officials immunity from civil liability,
41 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985).
42 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
43 Id.
44 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2643
(2009).
45 Id at 2642.
166 Trends and Issues in Education and the Law Vol. 6
one could argue that the Court is stating that this is not
common sense to a “reasonable person” (as defined by the
law).
From the standpoint of a parent whose child has been the
subject of a strip search, this outcome must be
incomprehensible and incite nothing but disappointment and
frustration. After exhausting all of the resources at the school,
the parent looks to the Court for justice and, yet, they find
none. After Redding, it is clear that the matter remains
unresolved. There is still no bright-line law that if violated,
will subject school officials to legal liability and civil
damages.
The Court grants qualified immunity when the individual
does not have reason to know his or her actions would subject
him or her to liability under the law. The trouble with this is
that the circumstances surrounding the search will never be
exactly the same.  Does this mean that the school officials
should always be granted immunity?
IV. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The case of Williams v. Ellington is most factually similar
to Redding.46 In Williams, a female high school student was
suspected of possessing drugs, and this suspicion ultimately
lead to a strip search.47 In Williams, the student produced the
contraband when confronted by school officials regarding a
tip from another student.48 However, the school officials were
not satisfied because “. . . the brown vial [produced] did not
match the description given by [the other student].”49 Their
dissatisfaction lead to a search of the girl’s locker and
purse.50 When the search revealed no drugs, the student was
then asked to take of her shirt, pull her pants down to her
knees, and remove her shoes and socks.51 No drugs were
found.  The court granted the school officials qualified
46 See Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
47 Id.
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immunity and held that the search was reasonable as set forth
by New Jersey v. T.L.O.52 The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
of T.L.O. is misguided.53 In T.L.O., the student being
searched initially denied the infraction.54 But in Williams, the
student produced a small vial of “rush” (the white powdery
substance that had been seen by the tipster).55 In T.L.O., the
inception of the search of the student’s purse was reasonable
because the school official had reasonable suspicion that the
search would reveal evidence of wrongdoing.56 In Williams,
the student voluntarily produced evidence of wrongdoing, but
was still subjected to a search.57 In Williams, the court used
the voluntary production of the “rush” as the basis for the
search,58 but if the court had followed the standard set forth in
T.L.O., the search would never have commenced.59
In Williams, the court refers to the reasonableness of the
extended search into the zippered pocket of the student’s
purse in T.L.O., and uses this example to justify the extended
search into the student’s locker, pockets, clothing, and
undergarments.60 The court incorrectly drew a nexus between
the search of a zippered pocket in a purse and a student’s
unclothed body.61
When no new evidence was found at each stage of the
search, reasonable suspicion was no longer present. The fact
that the school officials extended the search into more and
more intrusive areas is unreasonable. Perhaps, if the student
had not turned over the vial, a search would have ensued and
once the vial was found the school officials would have
stopped.
52 Id. at 886.
53 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
54 Id. at 328.
55 Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that “rush” is a legal substance, the inhalation of which is
illegal).
56 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
57 Williams, 936 F.2d at 887.
58 Id.
59 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
60 Id.
61 Williams, 936 F.2d at 887.
168 Trends and Issues in Education and the Law Vol. 6
The Sixth Circuit determined, based on its understanding
of T.L.O., that the “[school officials] were not unreasonable,
in light of the item sought . . . in conducting a search so
personally intrusive in nature.”62 Because of Redding, society
now knows just how wrong the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning
was.63 In Redding, at the very least, the Court held that the
strip search of the student was unconstitutional based on what
the school officials were searching for (prescription strength
ibuprofen):64
Because the suspected facts pointing to Savana
did not indicate that the drugs presented a
danger to the students or were concealed in her
underwear, [the school official] did not have
sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the
search to the point of making Savana pull out
her underwear.65
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit relied on the following
interpretation of T.L.O. for its rationale and holding that the
school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the
search of the student was reasonable:
A thorough review of T.L.O. reveals that the
Court was careful to protect a school official’s
right to make discretionary decisions in light
of the knowledge and experience of the
educator and the information presented to him
or her at the time such decision was made.
Like police officers, school officials need
discretionary authority to function with great
efficiency and speed in certain situations, so
long as these decisions are consistent with
certain constitutional safeguards. To question
an official’s every decision with the benefit of
62 Id.
63 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2636.
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hindsight would undermine the authority
necessary to ensure the safety and order of our
schools.66
While the court correctly states the standard established by
T.L.O., it applies it too liberally to the facts at hand.67
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit was faced with yet another case involving the strip
search of students.68 In Beard v. Whitmore Lake School
District more than twenty students (both male and female)
were searched because another student’s “prom money” that
was allegedly stolen during a gym class.69 Here, the court
held that the search was unreasonable because “. . . a search
undertaken to find money serves a less weighty governmental
interest than a search undertaken for items that pose a threat
to the health or safety of students, such as drugs or
weapons.”70 Although the court held that the searches were
unreasonable and unconstitutional it still granted the school
officials qualified immunity. It held that “[t]he law, at the
time the searches were conducted, did not clearly establish
that the searches were unreasonable under the particular
circumstances in [the] present case.”71
V. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
The Eleventh Circuit was faced with the issue of strip
searches in Thomas v. Roberts.72 Here, the court held that the
searches were unreasonable because they were conducted
without “individualized suspicion.”73 In this case, the entire
66 Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991).
67 See generally Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct.
2633 (2009).
68 See Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.
2005).
69 Id. at 601.
70 Id. at 605.
71 Id. at 606.
72 Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
73 Id. at 951.
170 Trends and Issues in Education and the Law Vol. 6
fifth grade class was searched for a missing twenty-six
dollars.74
The children were taken to their respective restrooms in
groups of four or five and were asked to pull down their pants
and lift up their shirts.75 “Officer Billingslea, a male, searched
the boys: as each boy dropped his pants, [he] visually
inspected the boys’ underwear to ensure that the money was
not inside.”76 And, “[m]ost of the girls were asked to lift their
bras and expose their breasts to ensure that the money was
not hidden under their bras.”77
In this case, the court cites the lack of assistance provided
by the Supreme Court’s decision in T.L.O.:
[T]he T.L.O. Court made no “attempt to
establish clearly the contours of a Fourth
Amendment right as applied to the wide
variety of possible school settings different”
from those presented by the facts of the T.L.O.
case. T.L.O. made clear only that a search of a
high school student’s purse for cigarettes is
reasonable if the student was accused of
smoking and then denied the allegation.78
This reasoning is what society should fear.  Because even
though the Supreme Court set precedent in Redding79 with
regard to strip searches in schools, it’s the lower court’s
subsequent interpretation that can harm children going
forward. Although many would argue once again that
common sense should have kept these strip searches from
occurring, the court in Thomas argues otherwise.80 In
determining whether or not the school officials are eligible
for qualified immunity, the court goes on to state that:




78 Thomas, 323 F.3d at 954 (citing Jenkings by Hall v. Talladega
City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
79 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
80 Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2003).
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If the salient question is whether T.L.O. gave
the [school officials] “fair warning” that a
“strip search” of an elementary school class
for missing money would be unconstitutional,
then the answer must be “no.” T.L.O.’s
balancing test will, in most instances, call for
school officials to speculate as to whether a
court applying the balancing test to specific
facts would find a search unreasonable.81
If school officials are left to use their own discretion
when considering the appropriate circumstances to search a
student, then what is reasonable? It is unclear how any school
official’s discretion could lead them to the understanding that
it is reasonable to strip search a fifth-grade child for twenty-
six dollars.  But the court disagrees.82 It found that the school
official’s actions were not so egregious as to “fall within the
slender category of cases in which unlawfulness of the
conduct is so obviously at the core of what the Fourth
Amendment prohibits that clarifying case-law is
unnecessary.”83
VI. A CLOSER LOOK ATQUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In 1975, the Supreme Court set forth the immunity
standards for school officials in Wood v. Strickland.84 In
Wood, the Court held that
. . . school officials are entitled to a qualified
good-faith immunity from liability for
damages under [the Civil Rights Act however]
they are not immune from such liability if they
knew or reasonably should have known that
the action they took within their sphere of
81 Id.
82 Id. at 953 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997);
Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997)).
83 Id.
84 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected . .
.85
This qualified immunity from a suit for damages is afforded
to school officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court
further stated that “the Civil Rights Act is not intended to be a
vehicle for federal court correction of errors in the exercise of
school officials’ discretion that do not rise to the level of
violations of specific constitutional guarantees.”86
In reaching its conclusion, the Court makes it a point to
ensure that a student’s constitutional rights are not forgotten,
asserting “[t]hat absolute immunity would not be justified
since it would not sufficiently increase the ability of school
officials to exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to
warrant the absence of a remedy for students subjected to
intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations.”87 It deems
that the school official’s so-called good faith is to be tested
both subjectively and objectively.88 The school official must
“be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right.”89
Objectively, the school official, “. . . who has voluntarily
undertaken the task of supervising the operation of the school
and the activities of the students, must be held to a standard
of conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also
on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights
of his charges.”90
The position of a school official requires a level of
education and common sense, along with a sensitivity and
awareness of the impressionable mind of a young student. It
requires the individual to remember not only the power of an
academic education, but also the powerful scar that can be
left on a child from a different kind of education. The great
responsibility of maintaining a safe and healthy environment
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 320.
88 Id. at 321.
89 Id.
90 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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for children to learn must somehow be balanced by the
importance of civility.
It is reasonable to grant school officials some degree of
deference to determine what steps need to be taken in order to
maintain a safe and healthy environment for learning, but not
at the cost of subjecting children to strip searches. With the
freedom the courts have allowed thus far, using their
discretion, school officials have deemed it reasonable to strip
search a student for the following reasons:
(1) Alleged wrongdoing based upon information
provided by another student;91
(2) Missing twenty-six dollars;92
(3) Missing a couple of hundred dollars;93
(4) Prescription strength ibuprofen;94
(5) Cocaine.95
In each one of these instances, the search was found to be
unreasonable, but the school officials were all granted
immunity from civil damages. In looking at each set of these
facts, common sense tells us that the actions of the school
officials were wrong. But yet, we do not hold them
accountable for their actions simply because of this notion
that the law was unclear and they could not have reasonably
known that what they were doing was unconstitutional.
Apart from the constitutional argument, it is hard to
understand how an educated person in today’s society would
not know that to strip search a child is wrong. In none of
these cases were the parents even notified that their child
would be the subject of a strip search. Aren’t criminals are
afforded more rights than this. Does society need to start
teaching children that they have a right to a phone call and an
91 See Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 1991); see
also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
92 See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
93 See Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir.
2005).
94 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
95 See Williams, 936 F.2d at 886.
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attorney before they comply what their teacher is asking of
them?
VII. CONCLUSION
According to the United States Supreme Court, its
decision in T.L.O. did not create a clearly established rule of
law with regard to strip searches by school officials of
students in public schools.96 Unfortunately because of this,
there are a number of children who have undergone highly
intrusive searches that have subsequently been found to be
unconstitutional.97 Although T.L.O. set forth the two-prong
test for a reasonable search of a student, it did not keep
students from being searched unreasonably and in violation
of their constitutional rights.98 As a result, school officials
across the country have enjoyed complete deference to their
discretion, as well as immunity from liability.99
As of June 2009, the Supreme Court established
precedent by virtue of its decision in Redding,100 but
unfortunately, past cases reveal that unless the circumstances
are exactly on point, school officials will not be subject to
liability for a strip search.101 There will always be an
argument in favor of qualified immunity when circumstances
of a case do not match precisely with a precedent.
It is foreseeable that strip searches in schools are not over,
and it is the author’s fear that until the courts are willing to
pierce through the veil of qualified immunity for school
officials, there will be no change. Perhaps parents can serve
their children best by educating them of their constitutional
rights and teaching them that it is ok to say “no” when a
teacher asks them to take off their clothes. At this juncture, it
is unclear whether or not the decision in Redding will expose
school officials to liability in the future (unless of course, it is
96 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
97 See, e.g., supra sections III–IV.
98 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
99 See, e.g., Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
100 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).
101 See, e.g., supra sections III–IV.
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a case involving a strip search of a student for prescription
strength ibuprofen).
